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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION
Philip G. Peters, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Critics of medical malpractice litigation believe that expert
testimony is often anecdotal and biased.' To remedy this problem,
several critics have recently suggested that courts "move toward
greater reliance on actual data, and less reliance on the recollections
of isolated experts. 2 Specifically, they suggest that social science
methods be used to ascertain what physicians actually do in
circumstances like those involved in the disputed case. With this
evidence, proponents argue, juries would get a more accurate picture
of clinical norms than they currently receive from the recollections
and anecdotal experiences of individual expert witnesses.
Unquestionably, reliable empirical evidence of clinical practices
has the potential to improve upon the adversarial descriptions of
reality that juries now hear from hired experts. By improving upon
the jury's understanding of clinical reality, empirical research about
clinical norms could lead to fairer verdicts.
However, the extent to which empirical evidence is likely to
improve the system of justice should not be overstated. At least
three factors could limit its impact. First, there are practical
obstacles to the funding of this research. Second, some claimed
negligence, such as the exertion of excessive pressure on the spinal
column during surgery, will not be amenable to a quantitative study
of customary practices under similar circumstances. Third,
researchers will need to be especially careful to design unbiased
* Associate Dean and Ruth L. Hulston Professor of Law, University of
Missouri-Columbia.
1. See Arthur J. Hartz et al., Physician Surveys to Assess Customary Care
in Medical Malpractice Cases; 17 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 546, 546 (2002);
William Meadow et al., Ought 'Standard Care' Be the 'Standard of Care'? A
Study of the Time to Administration of Antibiotics in Children with Meningitis,
147 AM. J. DISEASES CHILD. 40, 40 (1993); William Meadow & John Lantos, A
Proactive, Data-based Determination of the Standard of Medical Care in
Pediatrics, 101 PEDIATRICS e6 (1998), available at httpJ/www.pediatrics.
orglcgicontentlfullll014le6 [hereinafter Meadow & Lantos, Proactive); William
Meadow & Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts, 51 DuKE L.J. 629, 630-31
(2001).
2. Meadow & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 641.
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studies.
Nevertheless, these concerns should not obscure the concrete
benefits that could be conferred upon malpractice litigation by more
accurate evidence of clinical norms. Better empirical evidence will
help courts reach more accurate verdicts. As a consequence, it will
aid both deserving patients and wrongly-accused physicians. If our
expectations are realistic and the design pitfalls are avoided, then
the increased use of empirical research would constitute an
important improvement in malpractice adjudication.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part II outlines the
reasons why better malpractice evidence is needed. Part III
describes some practical limits on this research that should temper
our expectations. It also spotlights some design pitfalls that will
have to be avoided. Part IV then explores how the data might help
to decide actual cases. Finally, Part V explores in more detail the
special problem posed when no medical consensus exists about the
standard of care.
II. THE NEED FOR BETTER EVIDENCE
In most states, the legal standard of care for physicians is
determined by the medical profession. 3 In these states, proving the
standard of care means proving what physicians customarily do
4
under similar circumstances. Most of the remaining states use a
reasonable physician standard that assigns the task of standard-
setting to the jury rather than to the medical profession. In these
states, evidence of customary practices, while no longer conclusive,
is still admissible, highly relevant, and likely to be afforded great
weight.
As a consequence, accurate evidence of clinical customs is
crucial in malpractice litigation. Yet, critics believe that juries often
receive unreliable evidence about medical customs from partisan
experts hired by the parties. Experts have fallible memories' and
their experience is typically anecdotal and local, rather than
systematic and comprehensive.' David Eddy has described this
problem as follows:
3. Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom:
Malpractice Law at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 163, 163 (2001).
This is just one respect in which physicians were the favorites of the courts
during the early twentieth century. Id. at 192-201 (describing the laws and
their gradual abandonment).
4. Sometimes, the standard is what physicians in similar localities would
have done under the circumstances. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 6-2
(2d ed. 2000).
5. Meadow & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 631.
6. Id.; William Meadow & John D. Lantos, Expert Testimony, Legal
Reasoning, and Justice: The Case for Adopting a Data-Based Standard of Care
in Allegations of Medical Negligence in the NICU, 23 CLINICS PERINATOLOGY
583, 586 (1996) [hereinafter Meadow & Lantos, Expert Testimony].
[Vol. 37
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In fact it is a major research task to figure out what
practitioners in a community are doing. When an expert
answers a question about a community standard it is
extremely unlikely that he or she has any real data on actual
practices. It is far more likely that what an expert believes is
the practice in a community is what the expert believes should
be the standard of care.
Note that Eddy is describing the difficulty of ascertaining local
community norms, not national norms. Although the legal standard
of care was once set by local custom, today nearly all states have
moved to a standard of care based either on the customs in similar
locations around the country or, in the case of specialists, to a
national standard.' Abandonment of the locality rule made sense as
a matter of legal theory. However, the practical effect of the shift
from local to national standards was to place formidable demands on
expert witnesses. Physicians sparing a few hours of time from their
practice to testify cannot realistically be expected to have accurate
knowledge of the actual patterns of clinical practice around the
country. As a result, many must generalize from their own
(anecdotal) experience. Their testimony is, thus, much more likely
to describe what they and their colleagues do than what most
physicians actually do.9
Like all humans, expert witnesses are also subject to unfounded
optimism about how well they and their peers ordinarily perform.'"
This may make them vulnerable to the tendency of making unfairly
harsh judgments in hindsight." In addition, hired experts face the
natural tendency to favor "their" side,'2 especially if they depend
upon expert witness fees for a significant part of their income.
The jury must then evaluate this flawed testimony. Because
the jury has no independent basis for determining which of the tvo
very different pictures of clinical reality painted by the opposing
experts is correct, critics fear that the jury will make this choice
based on the speaking ability of the experts or based on the jury's
7. David M. Eddy, The Use of Evidence and Cost Effectiveness by the
Courts: How Can It Help Improve Health Care?, 26 J. HELTii POL. POL'Y & L.
387, 396 (2001) (emphasis in original).
8. See, e.g., WILLiAM J. CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW , ETICS 343-
44 (5th ed. 1998); FURROW ET AL., supra note 4, at 271-73.
9. See Hartz et al., supra note 1, at 551 (reporting a strong correlation
between physicians' self-reported conduct and criticism of the care provided).
10. Meadow et al., supra note 1, at 40 (demonstrating this bias in physician
estimates of how much time expires before a patient is treated with antibiotics);
see Meadow & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 639.
11. Meadow & Lantos, Expert Testimony, supra note 6, at 586.
12. Meadow & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 641 (citing Linda Babcock &
George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving
Biases, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMiCs 355, 355-65 (Cass R. Sunstein ed.,
2000)).
2002] 759
HeinOnline  -- 37 Wake Forest L. Rev. 759 2002
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
sympathy for the plaintiff.3 Thus, critics feel that more systematic
evidence of clinical practices is needed.
Although these concerns about jury manipulability are vastly
overstated, the recommendation itself is a good one. On the one
hand, a rich body of social science evidence strongly refutes the
allegation of pro-plaintiff jury bias in medical malpractice cases.14
The available evidence is also reasonably comforting on the issue of
jury capacity. 5 On the other hand, better evidence would make the
jury's job much easier and, therefore, has the potential to improve
the quality of its verdicts. Accordingly, we should look very closely
at the proposal that courts and attorneys make greater use of
empirical and social science research techniques to ascertain the
applicable standard of care."
III. SOME LIMITS AND SOME PITFALLS
There are several reasons to temper the hope that better
empirical evidence will transform malpractice litigation.
A. Who will fund the research?
1. Independent Foundations and Medical Organizations
In an ideal world, empirical research on clinical practices would
be sponsored by "neutral" entities, such as non-profit foundations
and medical organizations. The resulting data would then be
available for use by either party in future malpractice litigation.
This data would give physicians better guidance ex ante about the
level of care required in states using a custom-based standard of
care and it would improve the fairness of malpractice trials post hoc.
13. See id.; Meadow & Lantos, Expert Testimony, supra note 6, at 593.
14. NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY:
CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND
OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 11-22 (1995); see Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of
the Jury in Modern Malpractice Law, 87 IOWA L. REV. 909, 923-24 (2002)
[hereinafter Peters, Jury] (reviewing the literature).
15. See Peters, Jury, supra note 14, at 933. Some preliminary evidence
suggests, however, that juries may not have the stomach to take costs into
account. See W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by
the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 123-26 (2001); W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate
Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547, 557, 588 (2000)
[hereinafter Viscusi, Corporate Risk]; see also Peter D. Jacobson & Matthew L.
Kanna, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in the Courts: Recent Trends and Future
Prospects, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 291, 308-15 (2001) (discussing the
willingness of juries to tolerate explicitly cost-conscious medical treatment
decisions); Gary Schwartz, A National Health Care Program: What Its Effect
Would be on American Tort Law and Malpractice Law, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
1339, 1373 (1994
16. Depending upon the jurisdiction, this would mean studying either (1)
what physicians actually do in practice or (2) what physicians think a
responsible doctor would do. See infra text accompanying notes 29-35.
760 [Vol. 37
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In a world with scarce health care resources, however, these
organizations may be reluctant to take significant funds away from
research that has the potential to improve patient outcomes in order
to fund research that studies current practice patterns. Proponents
of this research will need to convince the funding organizations that
this research has value outside of the courtroom, such as identifying
the extent to which clinical practices have incorporated recent
scientific insights or evaluated the success of recent educational
efforts.
The incentive to fund these studies will also be reduced by the
knowledge that they quickly will become dated." In addition,
medical organizations may correctly perceive that their fingerprint
on a study would reduce the weight assigned to it by juries.
Thus, funding entities may limit their participation to: (1)
clinical settings that frequently result in litigation;"8 and (2) settings
where the findings will have educational value independent of their
use in litigation. In other cases, litigants probably will need to fund
the studies themselves or hope that an existing data bank can be
borrowed for this purpose, a subject explored in this Symposium by
Professor Mark Hall and his colleagues."
2. Litigants
New empirical research is expensive. In addition, it takes some
control of the evidence away from the trial attorneys. Under these
circumstances, the suggestion that parties sponsor more empirical
research is likely to be received coolly by attorneys for both parties.
Most likely, this research will be reserved for the most serious cases
and even then only undertaken when the party sponsoring the study
is very confident that the findings will support her case.
Furthermore, unfavorable findings need not (and will not) be
revealed to the other party or shown to the jury unless the study
was co-sponsored by the parties or ordered by the court.
The parties may also be discouraged by the likelihood that the
jury will discount the evidence. Research undertaken at the behest
of a party too often reflects that particular party's interests, as
research sponsored by drug manufacturers has shown.' As a result,
17. In addition, parties in disputed cases will claim that their case is
materially different from the setting studied in a prior research effort and this
charge will often be correct. Meadow and Lantos would put the burden of proof
on the person who claims such an exception. Meadow & Lantos, Expert
Testimony, supra note 6, at 589.
18. Id. at 592.
19. Mark A. Hall et al., Measuring Medical Practice Patterns: Sources of
Evidence From Health Services Research, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 779 (2002).
20. See Catherine D. DeAngelis et al., Reporting Financial Conflicts of
Interest and Relationships Between Investigators and Research Sponsors, 286
JAMA 89 (2001), available at httpJ/wwvw.jama.ama-assn.orgissues
/v286nl1fpdf/jed1OO41.pdf. See generally Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research,
2002] 761
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studies funded by a party may be viewed with skepticism by the
court and the jury."
Moreover, the expense of social science evidence will exacerbate
the high cost of litigating malpractice actions. Litigation costs in
medical malpractice actions are already so expensive that only the
most catastrophic medical injuries are worth litigating, no matter
how compelling the evidence of carelessness." With the added
expense of social science research, even fewer worthy claimants
would get their day in court. At the same time, added litigation
costs will increase the financial pressure on blameless defendants to
settle weak claims rather than litigate them.
To summarize, most of the empirical research on customs is
likely to be performed by parties. Absent pressure from the trial
court, a party is only likely to sponsor this research when the case
has considerable settlement value and the party anticipates
favorable findings. Given the impact of this research on litigation
costs and its limited medical value, this relatively modest use of
resources to fund litigation-sponsored customs research is probably
appropriate.
3. Existing Databases
Others participating in this Symposium will explore the use of
existing databases to ascertain clinical practice patterns. To the
extent that this exploration bears fruit, proof of clinical norms could
be cheaper and more credible than if it were funded by the parties
for purposes of litigation. Thus, this is a very promising line of
inquiry.
4. Courts
In the future, as courts learn that acquiring more accurate
evidence of clinical norms is often feasible, they could insist that
experts demonstrate a better evidentiary foundation for their
testimony about customary practices than they have demanded in
the past. They could, for example, use the spirit behind the Daubert
line of cases to insist that experts in medical malpractice cases make
some credible effort to sample industry practices before offering
testimony about industry norms.23 So far, the courts have not done
CDER Archives, Food & Drug Admininistration, at http://www.fda.gov/cder
/archives/default.htm (last modified Apr. 27, 2001) (providing various drug
research reports and statistics).
21. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1995) (emphasizing the extra weight assigned to independent research).
22. I often hear about thresholds of $200,000-$300,000 in expected value.
23. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (stating
that scientific evidence must have "a reliable foundation"); E. Haavi Morreim,
From the Clinics to the Courts: The Role Evidence Should Play in Litigating
Medical Care, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 409, 421 (2001) (stating the courts
should expect reliable scientific evidence). Daubert emphasized the trial court's
[Vol. 37762
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so.2 However, it is not clear that defense attorneys have properly
asked them to do so. My own sense is that defense lawyers have not
settled on a strategy for capitalizing in malpractice cases on the
broad judicial frustration with "junk science" and "hired gun"
witnesses. One option would be to ask courts to raise the minimum
level of preparation required before testifying about national clinical
practices.
If the courts accept this invitation to make expert witness
testimony more empirical and less anecdotal, they are likely to start
by gradually increasing the homework that expert witnesses are
required to do. The courts might, for example, insist on a better
effort by expert witnesses to familiarize themselves with actual
clinical norms, perhaps by undertaking at least a modest sampling
of the relevant community. The jury would then determine the
weight to assign to the testimony, depending on the quality of this
expert's inquiry. If the courts move in this direction, then attorneys
hoping to maximize the credibility of their own experts would be
encouraged to sponsor more reliable studies.
5. Dispute Managers, Including the Courts
Having an accurate picture of clinical norms would help
mediators, arbitrators, and judges to foster settlements by allowing
these dispute managers to give the parties an independent
assessment of their case. An independent study of clinical practices
commissioned by the dispute intermediary would act similarly to an
appraisal in real estate disputes. However, this idea is too untested
to assess its prospects.
B. Research Pitfalls and Limitations
1. Some malpractice settings will be more amenable to
quantitative research than others
Some clinical norms will be easier to document than others.2
duty to examine the expert's methodology. As Daniel Shuman has noted, this
inquiry involves a decision of whether to take some weight of the evidence
issues away from the jury. Daniel W. Shuman, Expertise in Law, Medicine, and
Health Care, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 267, 268, 272 (200 1).
24. Shuman, supra note 23, at 280-81. But see Williams v. Hedican, 561
N.W.2d 817, 829-30 (Iowa 1997) (applying Daubert and permitting testimony
about the need for treatment of pregnant women exposed to chicken pox to be
offered by an expert whose theory, while not yet widely peer-reviewed, had
recently been published in a medical journal).
25. Meadow & Lantos, Expert Testinony, supra note 6, at 593 (giving
examples of practices that are amenable to study); see Hartz et al., supra note 1,
at 554 (suggesting that surveys would work well for cases involving failure to
consult other sources, refer to a specialist, or order diagnostic tests); Meadow &
Lantos, Proactive, supra note 1, at 2-3 (suggesting that empirical evidence
would be useful for the study of the number of premature babies not treated in
2002] 763
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Retrospective chart reviews, for example, can measure only those
factors methodically recorded in the chart. Also, some clinical
dilemmas will occur too rarely to make the study of actual cases
practical. In those circumstances, researchers will need to ask
physicians what they think they would do in a certain situation,
rather than observing what they actually do."6 Even if the possible
biases associated with surveys can be avoided,"7 some malpractice
settings will be too complex or subtle for meaningful quantitative
study. Furthermore, cases turning principally upon a factual
dispute about the care actually provided or about its causative role
will not be candidates for an empirical study.28
2. Researchers will need to ask legally relevant questions
In their quest to improve malpractice adjudication, social
science researchers will be entering an arcane world in which the
legally important issues may not readily be apparent. The potential
to take a wrong turn is illustrated by a study published in 1993.29 It
was based on an actual case in which a baby had arrived at a
hospital with an unknown malady. Later, a diagnosis of possible
meningitis was made and antibiotics were initiated. Nevertheless,
the child had a poor outcome. In the ensuing litigation, the child's
expert said that the standard of care was to start antibiotics within
thirty minutes. The researchers had grave doubts about this
testimony and set out to test it. They found that the median time
for initiating antibiotics was 120 minutes from arrival, not thirty
minutes.
It is easy to understand why the authors were troubled by
testimony that they correctly sensed was erroneous. Nevertheless,
their effort to discredit the expert witness resulted in the pursuit of
a fact that was less important than others that they could have
studied. The time from arrival to prescription should not have been
a central issue in the case, as that time will understandably vary
depending upon the patient's symptoms at arrival. The truly
relevant question is whether the child's condition in the actual case
dictated the diagnosis of meningitis at a time significantly earlier
the delivery room or sent home without apnea monitors).
26. See Hartz et al., supra note 1, at 547.
27. See id. at 553-54 (discussing hindsight bias and self-serving bias). For
example, one of the shortcomings of surveys is that physicians may report what
they think they should do, rather than what they actually do. See id. at 553
(noting that one study found that a survey using vignettes produced better
indicators of actual behavior than chart review).
28. See id. at 547. Presumably, the feasibility will turn on whether the
dispute can be distilled into two scenarios that could each be presented to
respondents. In some of these cases, however, the standard will not be in
dispute.
29. See Meadow et al., supra note 1, at 40; see also Meadow & Sunstein,
supra note 1, at 637 n.33.
764 [Vol. 37
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than the actual diagnosis. If not, then it really does not matter how
long the child sat in the emergency room or whether that time
exceeded the median. This is a point that the defendant's attorney
and expert witnesses should have made clear to the court and jury.
3. Surveys must be designed to minimize respondent bias and
error
Researchers must anticipate the risk that physicians
responding to their surveys will not provide accurate answers or
that they will not answer the question asked.' Consider first
surveys designed to find out what physicians actually do. Surveys,
unlike chart reviews, introduce the risk that the respondents will
provide answers that are self-serving or are otherwise incorrect.
Physicians, for example, have been shown to be prone to an
optimistic bias. The bias appears to affect their estimates about
medical practices. In a study by Meadow and others, for example,
physicians regularly overestimated how quickly antibiotics are
usually prescribed for meningitis.3
The same rose-colored glasses can also affect a physician's
perception of her own conduct. For example, one study found that
physicians significantly overestimate the amount of time they spend
talking to their patients about healthy living and disease
prevention.32 Thus, physician descriptions of their own conduct may
be a less accurate picture of what they actually do and instead
represent what they wish they did.
Surveys of physicians' practices can, therefore, incorporate their
own systematic biases. Merely moving from the anecdotal
recollections of a single expert witness (as is typical in today's
litigation) to the collective recollections or opinions of a group of
experts (as would occur using a survey) is no assurance that the
information retrieved will be reliable. As a result, great care will
have to be taken in the design and analysis of the first surveys in
this field to determine the presence of bias and develop methods for
avoiding it.
Similar confusion could confound surveys that seek to
determine what responsible physicians ought to do (rather than
what they actually do). Placing this issue to a vote, as surveys do,
runs the risk of substituting majority practice for "good" practice or
"best" practice. If, as some research suggests, respondents usually
30. The choice of whom to survey will also be very important. In one study,
for example, the respondent's specialty significantly affected her answers. See
Meadow et al., supra note 1, at 42 (finding that the estimates given by pediatric
emergency experts were much more optimistic than those of specialists in
pediatric infectious disease).
31. See Meadow & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 637-38.
32. See C. Tracy Orleans et al., Health Promotion in Primary Care: A
Survey of U.S. Family Practitioners, 14 PREVENTATIVE MED. 636, 642 (1985).
2002]
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believe that other physicians should do what the respondent
currently does-even when the respondent's practices fall outside of
the range of acceptable practices- 33then the normative question will
get a positive answer. In that event, evidence offered to the jury
about what physicians feel is proper would simply be dressed up,
uncritical evidence of what physicians think that they do. Although
custom is a relevant barometer of what people in the field believe is
proper, measuring custom is not the same thing as determining
which customs are defensible. Whether surveys can help to educate
the jury to distinguish good medicine from common medicine
remains to be seen. One interesting strategy might be to ask
physicians whether practices of practitioners adhering to a different
school of thought also fall within the range of reasonable practice.
Although a negative answer to this question ought not be definitive
for obvious reasons, an affirmative answer would provide very
powerful evidence that both schools of thought are defensible.
4. Obtaining sufficient detail
Researchers must also be careful to disclose the entire pattern
of medical practice that they uncover and should not rely entirely on
shorthand summaries, such as the use of a median or mean. In the
study of meningitis medication times summarized above, the
median time to medication was two hours. That information would
have limited value if not accompanied (as it was in the study) by
information about the distribution of actual times. The
distributional data are needed because the median standing alone is
consistent with a variety of practice patterns with very different
legal implications. Tables I-IV, for example, all have the same
median (120 minutes).34 Yet, they show very different clinical
practice patterns.
33. See Hartz et al., supra note 1, at 551 (finding a strong correlation
between self-reported practices and evaluations of the conduct of others). Most
physicians assumed that other physicians would make the same decisions they
did, even when their decisions were unusual. Id.
34. Although these Tables apply to a setting in which the choices are
continuous, empirical evidence will also be useful when the choices are di- or
trichotomous, as in choosing between two surgical techniques and a non-
surgical intervention. See infra text accompanying note 40.
766 [Vol. 37
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As these Tables demonstrate, knowing that the median time to
medication was two hours (120 minutes) would not tell us whether a
genuine custom existed around that median (only Tables I and II
show a coherent custom) and, if it did, how much variation around
the median was routine (compare Tables I, II and IV). Indeed, a
median of 120 minutes is equally consistent with both complete
chaos (Table IV) and complete consensus (Table II).'
IV. EVIDENCE OF A SUBSTANTIAL CONSENSUS
Notwithstanding the need for modest expectations about usage
and for extreme care in study design, credible empirical evidence of
clinical norms still has the potential to improve the fairness of
malpractice litigation. 6 Under either standard of care, reliable
35. Furthermore, use of a bare median to set the standard of care is also
objectionable because it suggests that half of all the cases were treated
negligently. Resisting that odd conclusion, courts have long held that the
standard of care is set by the norms, not by the average. See, e.g., Nieves v.
Hosp. Metropolitano, 998 F. Supp. 127, 137 (D.P.R. 1998); Morlino v. Med. Ctr.
of Ocean County, 684 A-2d 944, 948 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); Spray v.
Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 624 P.2d 125, 132 (Or. Ct. App. 1981). Once again, Tables
III and IV demonstrate the point that it is really the range of reasonable
variance around the mean that matters. As a result, many courts would rightly
exclude evidence of the bare median or mean.
36. It could also produce some other, less central benefits. Here are five of
them: (1) Maverick physicians would learn where they, stand. Studies suggest
2002]
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evidence that a substantial professional consensus exists will help
the jury to decide the case fairly and the parties to settle it
amicably.
7
Table I illustrates this point. The graph tells the jury that a
consensus does exist and where. By comparing the defendant's
conduct to the graph, the jury can determine whether or not the
defendant's conduct falls outside of the consensus. In this case, D1
clearly falls within the standard of care. Thus, the chart will help
D1 to defend against an expert who contends that a thirty-minute
delay is standard.38 D3 has not complied with the standard of care
that outliers do not realize they are eccentric. Perhaps data showing their
eccentricity would prompt them to revisit their practices. (By contrast,
however, better evidence of practice patterns could magnify the pressure on
innovative physicians to stay in the pack.) (2) Reliable evidence of actual
practice patterns could help physicians or organizations that set very high goals.
The evidence of actual practices might help them to convince the jury that their
failure to meet their own goals was not a failure to provide competent care. (3)
Reliable evidence that several schools of thought exist may help cost-conscious
physicians. For cost-conscious physicians, social science evidence showing that
many others share their approach could offer a non-inflammatory way to defend
their practices, i.e., without requiring a physician to openly ask the jury for the
latitude to be cost-conscious. I am personally troubled by this attempt to
"finesse" the jury, but I confess that the desire to do so is an understandable
response to recent (albeit early) evidence that juries punish businesses that
explicitly take costs into account. See Viscusi, Corporate Risk, supra note 15, at
557. (4) Illuminating jury norms. By tracking how juries have decided cases in
which they have heard detailed evidence about practice patterns, we may
acquire a useful glimpse into the minds of juries. We might learn, for example,
how they expect physicians (or any defendant) to behave under conditions of
uncertainty. We might see, for example, whether they are willing to forgive
variations based on uncertainty about the efficacy of two alternative
treatments, but not disagreements over the marginal value of very expensive
and only slightly effective treatments. (5) Changing judicial expectations about
minimally sufficient evidence. One of the lessons of this Symposium is that
courts ought to ask to see the evidence behind an expert's opinion. Hopefully,
recognition of this fact will carry over into malpractice cases where no social
science studies are offered. In those cases, neither judges nor lawyers should
let an expert leave the witness chair without revealing the evidentiary basis for
her opinion.
37. This seems to be the use that Meadow and Lantos have in mind. See
Meadow & Lantos, Expert Testimony, supra note 6, at 592 (suggesting that the
evidence would only be dispositive in clear cases); Meadow & Lantos, Proactive,
supra note 1, at 2.
38. For this plaintiff to prevail, she will need to convince the jury that the
customary delay is inexcusable. In theory at least, she will only be permitted to
do this if she is in a state that has rejected the custom-based standard of care.
In reality, courts often let plaintiffs get to the jury when their experts have
offered an aspirational practice, rather than a customary practice, as the norm.
As Richard Lempert correctly points out, better empirical evidence of custom
may make it harder for the courts to permit such aspirational testimony or for
the court to give these cases to the jury. Richard Lempert, Following the Man
on the Clapham Omnibus: Social Science Evidence in Malpractice Litigation, 37
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 903 (2002). For those of us who think that customs
should not be conclusive, this would be an undesirable consequence of better
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and should have a good explanation for her conduct, while D2's
status is unclear.
One interesting consequence of displaying clinical norms in this
graphical way is that it reveals the normative discretion that the
jury possesses even when the jurisdiction uses a custom-based
standard of care and reliable evidence of clinical customs has been
presented. The jury must still decide how far down the sides of the
bell curve physicians should be allowed to vary without incurring
liability for any harm caused. (Thus, D2's liability is hard to
predict.) This decision requires a normative, rather than an
empirical, judgment and it is the traditional province of the jury to
render these judgments.' The courts have not discussed whether
jurors should be given any guidelines for using this discretion,
presumably because the parties have not yet offered evidence which
poses the issue so patently. Factors that ought to be relevant to the
jury's decision about the range of reasonable choice include the
degree of scientific uncertainty facing the physician, the length of
time that current best practices have been known, the limits on local
resources, and the unique characteristics of the patient.
Now consider Table II. It shows the same median as Table I,
but a much smaller range of divergence (i.e., a smaller standard
deviation). The contrast between Tables I and II demonstrates how
revealing empirical evidence can be. With a graph like this, the jury
will have a much more accurate picture of clinical norms than it
could hope to receive from individual experts." Here, the
information provided by the graph about the uniformity of
consensus (shown by the compactness of the curve) will help the jury
to decide how wide a range of clinical responses might be
reasonable. Note the implications for D2!
Recall the study of meningitis treatment. Assume that
researchers had found a cluster of times around the two-hour mark,
as shown in Table I. Evidence of this distribution might lead a jury
to conclude that any time within that cluster (say between 100 to
140 minutes) was "customary" or "reasonable." By contrast,
evidence that variation is minimal, as in Table II, might lead the
jury to identify a narrower range of permitted practice (e.g., 110 to
130 minutes).
empirical evidence. In my view, the better solution to this problem is to change
the standard of care, not to exclude empirical evidence. The jury should
understand that it is being asked to buck existing clinical norms.
39. See Meadow & Lantos, Proactive, supra note 1, at 5. This discretion
greatly complicates the task of experts who testify on the issue of causation,
because they need to determine whether the defendant's unreasonable delay
was harmful. To ascertain that, the experts need to know how long of a delay
would be regarded as reasonable.
40. See id. at 2.
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V. EVIDENCE OF MULTIPLE SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
In the past few decades, medical researchers have learned that
clinical practices vary dramatically and inexplicably.4" A number of
studies, beginning with the classic work of John Wennberg,42 have
demonstrated that physician practices vary widely, even within
narrow geographic limits. In Vermont, for example, eight percent of
the people in one community had their tonsils taken out while
seventy percent of the residents of a different community had the
surgery." In Iowa, the rate of prostate removal ranged from fifteen
percent to sixty percent." Furthermore, a Medicare study found
that procedure rates varied by more than three hundred percent for
more than one-half of the procedures studied.6
Many factors combine to produce this variation. The most
important factor is uncertainty." This uncertainty arises out of the
"bewildering variety of individual characteristics, histories, signs,
symptoms, and behaviors"" and the limited information about the
efficacy and risks of possible treatments, both at the population level
and at the level of these widely different patients. Patients vary in
ways that resist standardization." This variation in patients is
matched by a similar variety in possible therapeutic responses, each
with its own mix of benefits, risks, and costs. 4  Because of the
resulting uncertainty, reasonable physicians may disagree about the
best way to proceed.50
41. Portions of this section are drawn from Peters, Jury, supra note 14.
This variation may help to explain why defendants and plaintiffs are sometimes
able to find experts to support weak cases. When clinical preferences vary
widely, there is likely to be at least one physician who will (sincerely) say what
the lawyer needs to hear.
42. See, e.g., John E. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Malpractice
Variations: A Proposal for Action, 3 HEALTH AFF. 6, 6-7 (1984).
43. Id. at 9.
44. See id.
45. CURRAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 36.
46. See Eddy, supra note 7, at 391-92; Meadow & Lantos, Expert Testimony,
supra note 6, at 587.
47. Eddy, supra note 7, at 391.
48. See MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS 84-88 (1997)
(concluding that individual treatment decisions are complex and
individualized); James A. Henderson, Jr. & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health
Care and the Continued Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical
Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382, 1390 (1994) (concluding that the "highly
differentiated nature of medical problems" is an obstacle to the formation of
useful medical customs); Allan H. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical
Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 584 (1959) (stating that "there is no
'standard patient'").
49. Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 48, at 1390.
50. See, e.g., A. Russell Localio et al., Identifying Adverse Events Caused by
Medical Care: Degree of Physician Agreement in a Retrospective Chart Review,
125 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 457, 462 (1996) (finding only a slight correlation in
the findings of independent reviewers).
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Furthermore, physicians vary in their preferences and in their
knowledge of the medical literature. 1 Often the science itself is
uncertain, produced by gaps in the data or competing paradigms.
Finally, the movement of many employers away from fee-for-service
health plans and towards managed care plans has produced
significant differences among health plans in their resources and
their cost-containment philosophies." Under these circumstances,
there will rarely be a "custom" that provides a clear rule of decision.
However, the range of reasonable choices is not unbounded.'
Some variations will not be defensible, including deviations caused
by ignorance, inflexibility, habit, or obsolete information. Practices
driven by the desire to maximize income may also fall outside the
range of reason. David Eddy makes this point forcefully:
Indeed, given the very high rates of inappropriate care that
can prevail in communities, if we actually measured what
practitioners were doing and used that to define the standard
of care, we would run a high risk of installing an inappropriate
practice as the standard of care. The well-documented
overuses of hysterectomies, antibiotics, bypasses, and C-
sections are examples.5
A- Potential Benefits of Empirical Evidence
Empirical evidence that uncovers a pattern of variance can
provide three important benefits for the courts and attorneys who
must evaluate malpractice actions. First, accurate empirical
evidence will aid the court in determining whether the defendant's
conduct fell outside of all accepted schools of thought. In these
circumstances, sound evidence of the range of accepted practices will
help the plaintiff prove her case and help the jury decide it.
Second, reliable evidence of multiple standards will prevent the
jury from accepting erroneous claims by the opposing experts that a
single standard of care exists and that it favors them. Under
current practice, both experts try to "cull a single standard of care
from the cacophony of opinion.""5  By refuting the incorrect
contention that a single standard exists, the empirical evidence will
51. Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 48, at 1391.
52. Id. at 1399-1400; E. Haavi Morreim, Medicine Meets Resource Limits:
Restructuring the Legal Standard of Care, 59 U. PiTT. L. REv. 1, 8-20, 94-95
(1997); see also Page Keeton, Medical Negligence-The Standard of Care, 10
TEx. TEc-L. REv. 351, 365, 368 (1979) (characterizing customs as "fictitious").
53. See HALL, supra note 48, at 103 (noting that physicians, when placed
under scrutiny, may attribute more uncertainty to their work than actually
exists).
54. Eddy, supra note 7, at 396.
55. Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice
Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. RE%. 645, 684-85
(2001).
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transform the jury's inquiry away from a search for "the real"
standard of care into a reflection on how to decide cases in which no
single standard of care exists. That shift is highly important and is
discussed further below.
Third, in a setting where more than one school of thought is
likely to be found, researchers can specifically ask respondents
whether they consider more than one school of thought to be
reasonable. An affirmative answer to that question would provide
very helpful information for the jury in its task of determining
whether to treat both schools of thought as defensible.56 At the same
time, highlighting the presence of two schools of thought will
sharpen the jury's inquiry into the adequacy of the disclosure that
preceded the patient's consent to one of those permissible
approaches.57
Finally, by making the ubiquity of medical variation more
visible to the courts, empirical evidence may prompt the courts to
clarify the rules governing the resolution of cases when there is no
single standard of care.
B. Legal Issues Raised by Variation
For the courts, the mixture of excusable and inexcusable
variation presents a dilemma. To do justice to both parties in the
face of this variation, courts will need a standard for sorting good
medicine from bad. They must fashion the law of malpractice so
that inexcusable variations lead to liability, but excusable variations
do not.
General negligence law makes no special accommodation for the
problems raised when uncertainty produces a variety of responses,
many of which may be reasonable. However, malpractice law
already has a rule designed specifically for this situation. The
"respectable minority" or "two schools of thought" rule permits
physicians to choose among respectable schools of medical thought
without fear of liability. 8  This rule arises out of judicial
unwillingness to choose among conflicting schools of thought when
physicians themselves cannot reach a consensus. 9 As a result,
56. See supra notes 36-54 and accompanying text.
57. See John E. Wennberg & Philip G. Peters, Jr., Unwarranted Variations
in the Quality of Health Care: Can the Law Help Medicine Provide a
Remedy/Remedies?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 925, 932-33 (2002) (discussing the
importance of informed consent when medical variation is justifiable).
58. See, e.g., Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 87 (Me. 1974) ("[A] physician
does not incur liability merely by electing to pursue one of several recognized
courses of treatment."); Haase v. Garfinkel, 418 S.W.2d 108, 114 (Mo. 1967)
(stating there can be differences of opinion among competent physicians);
FURROW ET AL., supra note 4, at 382-84 (describing the respectable minority
defense).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A cmt. f (1965) ("The law cannot
undertake to decide technical questions of proper practice over which experts
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physicians are theoretically insulated from liability both when they
comply with an established custom and when respectable medical
opinion is divided. In theory, the respectable minority rule
eliminates the need to identify a single professional norm.
However, courts have not applied the respectable minority rule
in this fashion. Instead, courts give these cases to the jury. As
Professor Mark Hall has noted, "[tihis breakdown between theory
and practice essentially allows the jury to impose, based on its own
independent judgment, the governing standard of care-the very
result malpractice law attempts to avoid."' In practice, therefore,
the custom-based standard of care routinely fails to provide an
external benchmark to displace the jury's independent
determination of reasonability." Thus, the jury uses its best
judgment just as it would in states that have abandoned the custom-
based standard of care.62
What does all of this have to do with the use of empirical
evidence to prove clinical practices? First, empirical evidence will
let the jury know when no single "gold standard" exists in clinical
practice. This information will refashion the jury's task in the case.
Its job will no longer be to determine which expert is most
accurately describing the standard of care. Instead, its project will
be to determine whether the defendant's school of thought is
"respectable," i.e., whether it has a justifiable explanation, such as
clinical uncertainty, or whether the defendant occupies a pocket of
bad medicine prompted by habit or self-interest.
Second, frequent reliance on social science evidence will educate
the courts about the frequency with which variation in practice
occurs. This variation calls into question an underlying premise of
the custom-based standard of care. By calling attention to the
reality, ubiquity, and inexplicability (even to medical experts) of
clinical practice variation, social science evidence may prompt those
courts which still use a custom-based standard of care to rethink
reasonably disagree.").
60. Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in
Malpractice Litigation, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 129 (1991); see Peters,
Jury, supra note 14, at 947 (noting the failure of the respectable minority rule
to keep these cases from the jury).
61. One potential solution would be to make the respectable minority rule
more concrete by using a strictly quantitative definition of respectability.
However, that would employ a criterion that is a poor proxy for reasonability.
62. However, reasonability states have more appropriate evidentiary rules.
To inform the jury, the parties can introduce any relevant evidence bearing on
the reasonability of the defendant's conduct, including evidence of clinical
practices and evidence of the efficacy, risks, and costs of the options facing the
defendant. The defendant can offer evidence about any scientific uncertainties
that complicated her decision. The plaintiff can introduce evidence showing
that a particular practice is no longer a good practice, including journal articles,
recent texts, evidence-based clinical practice guidelines, and the testimony of
respected experts.
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their deference to custom, at least when no dominant custom
exists.63 That step would make the law more coherent and juries
could then focus on the task of identifying the range of reasonable
clinical choice.
C. Empirical Evidence and the Evaluation of Multiple Schools of
Thought
At the outset, reliable evidence of practice patterns will help the
court to determine whether two distinct schools of thought actually
exist. On the facts depicted in Tables I and II, for example, a
defendant whose expert attempted to describe the defendant's four-
hour delay as consistent with one accepted school of thought would
be revealed as an outlier. If, on the other hand, the study revealed a
pattern like that in Table III, then the defendant's contention would
be confirmed. The jury could then proceed to determine whether
this school of thought was "respectable" or "reasonable." Evidence
that the profession was evenly divided, as shown in Table III, would
make the plaintiffs case very difficult. The plaintiff would need to
have convincing evidence that one approach was obsolete or self-
interested.64
In Table V, by contrast, the defendant's school of thought is
much smaller and less aggressive than its alternative. Here, the
jury would probably expect the defendant, rather than the plaintiff,
to offer a convincing explanation for adopting a less aggressive
approach, such as recent evidence that premature prescription
causes needless side effects or is ineffective. Table VI illustrates
how empirical studies could provide similar information when
physicians face a choice among non-continuous options, such as
choosing between surgery and bed-rest.
VI. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding its limitations, good empirical evidence of
actual medical practices has the potential to aid the jury
considerably. At least in theory, it could be useful in both the "easy"
cases (where it reveals that a consensus standard of care exists) and
also some of the harder cases (where clinical practices vary). At the
same time, the evidence will make the phenomenon of medical
variation more visible to judges, highlighting the need to give juries
better guidance on issues such as permissible variation around a
single norm and the identification of unacceptable schools of
thought. Ideally, the new evidence of inexplicable variation in
63. For an extended discussion of the choice between these two standards
of care, see Peters, Jury, supra note 14.
64. Patients can identify contexts in which self-interested overtreatment or
selection of treatment is especially likely by using databases such as
Dartmouth's Atlas of Health Care Database. See Wennberg & Peters, supra
note 57.
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clinical practice will also encourage courts to abandon their
conclusive deference to medical custom in favor of a standard of care
that makes custom (when it exists) relevant, but not dispositive.
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